The deregulated electricity markets are expected to be perfectly
competitive, yet they remain oligopolistic in which the market
participants are able to exercise market power to "game" the
markets. Game theory, by its nature, is considered as the
appropriate framework to study the interactive behaviors of decision
makers with conflict of interest. Substantial research has been
devoted to study gaming behavior in the deregulated electricity
market using game theory. However, most of the modeling of the
markets is static and this type of model leads to non-optimal
results for long-term strategic planning due to the inherent dynamic
nature of the market. This book formulates and describes the gaming
behavior in the deregulated electricity market from a dynamic point
of view, considering long-term interests in a changing environment.
It starts with a review of the current situation of deregulation and
a brief review of near-term energy issues. The book includes the
latest results on bidding dynamic strategies for such markets.