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Multistage Arbitration Game with Random Offers pp. 409-418 $100.00
Authors:  Vladimir V. Mazalov, Minoru Sakaguchi and Anatoly A. Zabelin
Abstract:
We consider here a two-person time-sequential game intended to model a competitive behaviors
of two players who may have different aims. One of possible application of this game
is a model labor-management negotiations during a given length of periods. In this model
there are two players Labor (player I) and Management (player II) which must decide the
monthly wage payed to I by II. Player I is interested to maximize it and, respectively, player
II - minimize it. Negotiations among two players are made during a period [0, n] within
which the final decision must be reached. There are a few models related with arbitration
procedure [1-5]. Most of papers [1-4] analyze a model where offers are made by players and
there is third independent participant - arbitration committee - which chooses one of them.
In the article [5] a model with arbitration committee was considered which is composed of
the two arbitrators and each arbitrator proposes a solution for the wage in each period as
long as the negotiation continues.
Another application is the secretary problem for the players having different aims [6, 7,
8]. Suppose that the same players I (Labor union) and II (Management) jointly employ one
secretary. Player I(II) is interested to employ a secretary who has better ability in computer
technology (management job). Finally, notice the cake division problem. 


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Multistage Arbitration Game with Random Offers pp. 409-418